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Indeterminacy and Welfare Increasing Taxes 
in a Growth Model with Elastic Labour
Supply *




The inclusion of a labour/leisure choice in endogenous growth models 
has interesting and somewhat counter-intuitive effects. For some pa­
rameter values the economy is a stable dynamical system so the market 
equilibrium is indeterminate. Odd effects of policy appear. The long-run 
growth rate is increased by lump sum taxes used to fund wasteful gov­
ernment spending. Again for parameter values, such policy can increase 
the representative consumer’s welfare.
*We would like to thank Michele Boldrin, Roger Farmer, Akos Valentinyi and the par­
ticipants in the 1995 Annual Meeting of the Society for Economic Dynamics and Control 
in Barcelona for helpful suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. This work was partly 






















































































































































































In this paper we study and draw some policy implications of a simple model 
of endogenous growth, where agents elastically supply labour. A first issue we 
address is if the market situation can be indeterminate in the model. We define 
indeterminate a situation in which there exists a whole interval of different 
equilibrium paths sharing the same initial condition.
Recently a number of papers has appeared that study the transitional 
dynamics in models of unbounded accumulation and focus in particular on the 
problem of indeterminacy of equilibria. One distinguishes between local inde­
terminacy that is the existence of a continuum of equilibria in a neighborhood 
of a balanced growth path and global indeterminacy that arises in models with 
multiple growth paths, the selection between which depends on control vari­
ables. We also have models with multiple balanced growth paths that do not 
exhibit indeterminacy i.e. whose asymptotic equilibrium is known when initial 
conditions are given.1
Formally for an equilibrium solution to be locally unique, i.e. for a bal­
anced growth path to be determinate, the Jacobian matrix of the system evalu­
ated at the balanced growth path must not have more eigenvalues with a strictly 
negative real part than there are state variables.
As is well known stable steady states are associated with a continuum 
of rational expectations equilibria driven by self-fulfilling beliefs. These are 
dynamic examples of what Shell (1977) labeled “sunspot equilibria” and have 
welfare properties much different from equilibria that depend only on funda­
mentals. In a growth framework the existence of a continuum of equilibria 
means that countries with identical tastes technology and initial endowments 
will converge to the same constant growth rate only in the very long run— 
while the level of income will remain different for ever. This seems an expla­
nation deserving investigation for the differences in the growth patterns of the 
various countries observed in reality. The models suggest the possibility that 
appropriate policy interventions will in fact raise welfare, acting as selection 
devices for equilibria that differ during the transition interval. In fact cultural 
and institutional features in general may be seen as playing this same role.
An extremely simple example of indeterminacy in a growth model is of­
fered by Benhabib and Rustichini (1994). They assume utility logarithmic over
1A leading example is the model by Azariadis and Drazen (1990) featuring thresholds 



























































































consumption while knowledge is the only capital good. In the social production 
function of knowledge there are constant returns to knowledge and strictly in­
creasing returns to labour. As is known increasing returns can be accomodated 
in an equilibrium framework either through externalities or through monopo­
listic competition, the first way being often preferred, for its simplicity. This 
model has the additional controversial feature of an upward sloping labour de­
mand. Although it is extremely difficult to provide intuitive explanations for 
the behaviour of dynamical systems, the following reasoning, although incom­
plete, may be useful to understand the key mechanism at work in producing the 
indeterminacy result in this model. Imagine starting from an equilibrium path 
and building another one by increasing consumption i.e. reducing the fraction 
of labour devoted to accumulate knowledge. To avoid violating a non-negativity 
constraint or the transversality condition it is necessary for the rate of growth 
of consumption to fall even more than the rate of growth of knowledge so the 
economy eventually returns to the balanced growth path. To begin with, this 
is possible, in equilibrium, only if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 
consumption is not too low. A further necessary condition for this decrease in 
the growing rate of consumption to be (privately) optimal is that the rate of 
return on capital decreases enough. The assumption of increasing returns to 
labour is necessary for this to happen in this model. Benhabib and Rustichini 
also consider the same model with leisure entering the utility function linearly. 
This makes for indeterminacy since now the reduction in the rate of capital ac­
cumulation can be brought about by a reduction in labour supply, which reduces 
the rate of return on capital. Benhabib and Farmer (1994) further the analysis 
of this issue studying a model in which utility is additively separable over the 
logarithm of consumption and a power function of labour supply. They assume 
an increasing returns Cobb-Douglas technology using labour and capital. They 
study two versions of the model: in the first the marginal productivity of capital 
is decreasing, so, asymptotically, the economy reaches a stationary state. In the 
second the social production function is linear in capital so the mode
1 displays endogenous growth. For both versions a necessary condition for 
indeterminacy is that the exponent of labour in the social production function 
is greater than one, the difference between the two being positively related to 
the (absolute value) of the inverse of the labour supply elasticity.
Coming to investigations of the transitional dynamics in two capital goods 
models with increasing returns there are the studies, conducted with different 
methods, by Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Chamley (1993), Caballe and 





























































































Ortigueira and Santos (1994).
The presence of a second capital good e.g. human capital makes for 
indeterminacy because, again starting from equilibrium, the reduction in the 
marginal productivity of physical capital necessary to justify the slowing down 
in its accumulation and in the rate of growth of consumption may be brought 
about by a simultaneous deceleration in the accumulation of human capital. 
As regards the Lucas (1988) model without externalities Caballe and Santos 
notice however that stability can be ruled out by the strict concavity of the 
optimization problem. In fact otherwise there would be a continuum of initial 
values of the controls converging optimally to the same steady state but then 
convex combinations of those would yield higher welfare.
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1992) calibrate the same model and report 
that computer experimentation has not found any balanced growth equilibrium 
which does not display saddle-path stability, even with mild externalities to 
human capital in the production of goods. Benhabib and Perli qualify this re­
sult showing that necessary conditions for local indeterminacy are i) the time 
discount factor is higher than the sum of the rate of population growth and of 
the parameter measuring the effectiveness of investment in human capital and 
ii) the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption is greater than 
one by a difference inversely related to the size of the externality parameter. 
Finally a sufficient condition is that there are strictly increasing returns to hu­
man capital. Xie studies the same model under the restriction that the inverse 
of the elasticity of substitution of consumption is equal to the share of capital. 
This allows one to explicitly solve for the time paths of the variables and to 
show that, under increasing returns to human capital, i.e. if there is a contin­
uum of equilibria, indexed by the initial fraction of non-leisure time devoted to 
goods production, a country with lower endowments of both kinds of capitals 
can overtake a country with greater endowments, if the investment in human 
capital is high enough. He also proves that an equilibrium associated with a 
lower initial fraction of non-leisure time devoted to goods production always 
gives higher utility. Chamley modifies the Lucas model assuming no external­
ities in the production of goods and assuming instead a spillover effect to the 
fraction of time devoted to “learning”, i.e. to accumulating human capital, as 
opposed to “doing”. He notices that if the necessary and sufficient condition for 
uniqueness of equilibrium he provides is violated indeterminacy may arise. This 
condition is formulated in terms of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
of consumption— a higher value of which is conducive to stability—the first and 




























































































erage time devoted to learning, and the learning time itself, all measured on the 
balanced growth path. The more concave the learning function the less likely 
stability, a necessary condition for which is the presence of the spill-over effect 
mentioned above. Benhabib and Perli also numerically study a version of the 
Lucas model with preferences specified as in Benhabib and Farmer. They also 
adopt more general Cobb-Douglas specifications for the production functions in 
the two sectors allowing the exponents of labour quality (human capital) to be 
different from those of labour quantity. Finally they consider external effects 
to human capital in both sectors and an external effect to labour in the edu­
cation sector. In fact the exponent of labour in the state equation for human 
capital turns out to be the critical element in the analysis: if it is less than 
one there is only one, determinate, balanced growth path; if it is bigger than 
one there are either none or two balanced growth paths, the one with lower 
steady state growth being always determinate and the other indeterminate if 
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labour is high enough. In fact 
there is a tradeoff between the size of the exponent of labour in the state equa­
tion for human capital, capturing the external effect of labour and the size of 
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labour in the utility function, so 
stability obtains even if the latter is very low (i.e.-lOO) provided the former is 
very high (i.e. 0.6). However combinations of the two consistent with stability 
deliver unplausibly low rates of growth. So the basic result of the model is that 
strictly increasing returns to labour in the production of human capital deliver 
global indeterminacy in the sense that the initial endowments of the two capital 
stocks are not sufficient to select one optimal orbit.
To sum up it seems that what all these models have in common is that 
they find that a condition for indeterminacy is that there are increasing returns 
to labour and/or human capital in the production of at least one factor that 
can be accumulated whether it is physical capital, human capital or knowledge.2 
In this paper we are however able to present an example of indeterminacy in 
an economy with decreasing returns to labour and constant returns to capital. 
We show this in a simple one sector model where consumption and leisure are
2Ladron-de-Guevara et al.(1994) show that even without externalities it is possible to 
have a multiplicity of steady states with an additively separable utility function logarithmic 
in consumption and CES in leisure, in a two capital good model. In the only numerical 
example, built assuming a Cobb-Douglas technology, they study as regards the transition 
properties of the steady states it turns out that there are three (optimal) steady states, one 
unstable and two saddle point stable, and that which of these two is relevant as an attractor 





























































































both highly intertemporally substitutable while the factors of production are 
highly complementary. A heuristic explanation is the following: starting from 
an optimal path if one attempts to construct a new equilibrium by increasing 
consumption then if the elasticity of substitution of consumption is more than 
one leisure will increase as well. If the elasticity of substitution between labour 
and capital is low the reduction in labour supply will cause a sharp decline in 
the interest rate. But with a high elasticity of substitution of consumption this 
can cause an even sharper decline in the rate of growth of consumption that 
could decline even more than the rate of growth of capital. Thus the economy 
would return to the balanced growth path.
We also consider some implications of the model for tax policy. In endoge­
nous growth models, since policies have the potential to influence the growth 
rate in the long run, there is generally a much larger quantitative influence of 
policies on welfare than in the neoclassical model, where the growth rate is 
governed asymptotically by the exogenous rate of technical progress. Recent 
papers by Jones and Manuelli (1990), Lucas (1990), King and Rebelo (1990), 
Rebelo (1991), Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993), Stokey and Rebelo (1993), 
Roubini and Milesi-Ferretti (1994) and others have used endogenous growth 
models to look at both the positive and normative aspects of taxation. These 
authors use a similar basic framework, assuming that there is a “core” of capital 
goods which can be produced without the the direct or indirect contribution of 
non-reproducible factors. Indeed most analyses follow Lucas (1988) in permit­
ting labour input to be reproducible. The Lucas model is variously extended for 
instance to allow for labour supply being elastic and/or for a commodity input 
entering the accumulation of human capital. In general externalities are ruled 
out so that the competitive and optimal allocations coincide in the absence of 
public interventions. These works focus in particular on flat-rate taxes, in par­
ticular on capital and labour income, whose proceeds are assumed to be rebated 
as lump-sum transfers. They try to determine how changes in the tax structure 
affect the division of production between consumption and investment, the di­
vision of time between leisure and income-directed activities and the division 
of income directed time between the production of goods and the accumulation 
of human capital.3 It is generally recognized in the literature that if the social 
rate of return on investment exceeds the private return, subsidies to investment 
can raise the growth rate and levels of utility. However it has not been noticed
Q uantitative assessments of the size of the effects of tax reform towards the optimal tax 
structure on welfare and growth are then offered calibrating the model to U.S data. In fact 




























































































that a lump-sum tax may in itself stimulate growth increasing welfare. In fact 
lump sum taxes have an impact on the allocation of resources because due to 
income effects they influence labour supply and therefore the rate of return on 
capital i.e. the rate of growth. The.standard practice of evaluating all other 
taxes by assuming revenues are returned as a lump sum transfer is misleading 
in this case. In particular in our model a lump sum tax will increase growth, 
by making people work more even if the tax revenue is thrown away instead of 
being used to subsidize investment. Moreover we show that, for some parameter 
values, this can increase the representative consumer’s welfare.
The paper has four sections the first of which is this introduction. The 
second presents a model of unbounded accumulation with leisure in the utility 
function. The third deals with tax policy. The fourth draws conclusions.
2 A M odel
In this section we present a simple endogenous growth model with variable 
labour supply. All worker/consumers are identical and maximize the same CES 
intertemporal utility function, multiplicatively separable in consumption of the 
homogeneous good C and leisure l:
/•oo Cl~a
V =  e~<*------ll~xdt (1)
Jo 1 — <7
where either c r < l , x < T ° '  +  X > l o r c r > l > X> l -  These restrictions insure 
strict quasi-concavity of the objective function. As is standard from Romer 
(1986) we assume that there is a continuum of competitive firms and that the 
production set at the firm level is convex in labour L and capital K  but that 
average capital K  causes a labour augmenting spill-over which is taken as given 
by each firm, so that the social production function is linear in capital. With 
population normalized to one production Y  is then given by equation 2
Y  = F{LK ,K ) = KF{L,1) = K f(L )  (2)




Equation 2 gives the instantaneous budget con-
Y - C






























































































The static first order condition for the choice between labour and leisure 
is equation 4
(1 — L)(\ — a) 1 
C ( i - x )  w (4)
The consumers consumption savings choice implies the Euler equation 5 
along with a transversality condition that the present value at time zero of the 
capital stock at time t goes to zero.
C , 1 % L
a -  +  (1 ~  X h ------T =  r -  pC 1 - L (5)
Plugging the time derivative of the log of equation 4 into equation 5 gives 
equation 6
(-1  +  X +  ^ ) §  +  (1 -  x) ^  = *• -  P =  ^  +  (1 -  -  x)  (6)
Profit maximization by firms and perfect competition give the wage and 
real interest rate.
W  =  K f'(L )  (7)
and
r = F2(L K ,K ) = F2(L ,l) ( 8)
Note that equation 7 and equation 4 together imply that the ratio of 
consumption to capital is a monotonically decreasing function of labour supply.
Equation 7 implies that the rate of growth of wages is described by equa­
tion 9
W K  f"(L) L 
W K + f'(L) (9)
The instantaneous budget constraint 3, the first order condition for con­
sumption and leisure 4 and the wage 7 imply equation 10:
( 10)
Which shows that the rate of growth of capital is a monotonically increas­
ing function of labour supply. This means that if and only if labour supply L 
is fixed then the growth rate of capital and, as noted above, the consumption 
capital ratio are fixed and the economy experiences balanced growth. Define L 




























































































Combining equations 6, 8, 9 and 10 we finally obtain equation 11 the law 
of motion of labour supply which relates the time derivative of L to L.
v  + X -
(1 - L )  )
L = p —r + a ( l - L ) ( l - g )
( i - x )
( 11)
This is not a simple or elegant equation, but it shows how to choose p 
to make any labour supply L the balanced growth labour supply. With dL/dt 
equal to zero equation 11 becomes an equation which gives p as a function of L. 
Furthermore note that this p is positive if L is less than and a < 1. Also
notice that if L were equal or larger than 2 1 the term inside the parenthesis 
in the right-hand side of 11 would be equal or larger than the interest rate. But 
this would violate the tranversality condition p > g{\ — a) where g = (r — p) /o  
indicates the asymptotic rate of growth. The condition can be then rewritten
r(L) > g(L) ( 12)
and
p > r(Z)(l — a) (13)
Equation 11 is also useful when studying the dynamics of the economy 
near balanced growth labour supply Z. It is fairly easy to determine the sign 
of d L /dL. This is interesting, since if, for L just below Z, L is increasing and 
vice versa then the balanced growth path is dynamically stable. This would 
imply that the market equilibrium is not determined by initial state (capital 
stock) and that the market outcome could be affected by a sunspot.
To decide if the balanced growth path is stable and indeterminate first 
note that for all L the left hand side is a positive multiple of the time derivative 
of L. Call this multiple a(L). At the balanced growth labour supply Z the 
derivative a'(L) does not affect the total derivative of equation 11 since it is 
multiplied by zero. This means that the effect of L on the time derivative of L 





+ o [}'CL) (2 - o - x )
( i - x )
( l - Z ) ( l - < 7 )
(1-x) (14)
If the right hand side of statement 14 is negative then the balanced growth 
path is stable and indeterminate. That is the balanced growth path is stable 
and indeterminate if inequality 15 holds




























































































It is fairly clear that inequality 15 holds for some production functions and 
for some parameter values. It is necessary that the elasticity of substitution of 
capital and labour is very low so the wage falls sharply and the interest rate 
rises sharply as labour supply increases. It is also necessary that little leisure is 
consumed so that the final term in statement 15 is small. Finally it is necessary 
that a is small that is that marginal utility of consumption declines only slowly 
as consumption increases.
It is not at all evident that all of these conditions can be met by an eco­
nomically meaningful solution to the differential equation that is by a solution 
which satisfies the transversality condition. However that it is possible for in­
equalities 13 and 15 to hold as is shown below by giving a specific example of 
a stable balanced growth path which satisfies the transversality condition.
We consider a CES production function with elasticity of substitution of 
W -. (f> must be less than one if the single firm is to face a concave programming 
problem. So we have:
y = [ a ( I i ) *  +  ( l - a ) f f ^  (16)
This implies equations 17, 18, 19 and 20.
W = f'{L )K  = aL,t,- lK[aL'l‘+ (17)
= f"(L) = o(l -  a)(4> ~ 1 )L*~2 [aL* + 1 -  a ] ~ ^  (18)
r = (1 -  a) [aL* + 1 -  (19)
=  a ( l  -  a)(l -  [a l*  + 1 -  a] ^~2 (20)dL L J
Equation 11 now reads like
p -  [a ir*  + 1 -  a] * 1 [(1 -  a )(l -  a ) ! 1"* -  L + ao-^frj)]
L — g+x-i | (1-flKl-a)
i - L  L[aL 'P+1—a]
( 21)
Inequality 15 becomes inequality 22
0 > a (2 - C r - X )  (i-x) [ a l*  +  1 — a] +  (1 — <p)(l — a )
' (1 — L)(l — a) 





























































































We study the case of a < 1, <f> < 0. Consider the partial derivative of 
the expression in 22 with respect to L (the balanced growth labour supply), 
calculated keeping a, a, x , <P constant
I ~ ~ (23)
This is always negative for <f> < 0. So we want to choose p in such a way as to 
make L as big as possible. Recall that L can take any positive value less than 
s — for some positive p, if a is less than one. As L goes to . from below
inequality 22 becomes inequality 24:
0 > °<d2-g-x) ( i-g
1-x \2-x-eJ , (24)
+ ( ! - « )  [ ( l - 0 ( « 7 - l )  +  * ^ ]
This inequality can hold for negative values of <j>, for some utility functions. For 
instance as x  goes to 1 — cr and a goes to zero, it holds if cj) is less than — prj-
This shows how it is possible to construct a model with a stable indeter­
minate balanced growth path, utility a time separable Cobb-Douglas function 
of consumption and leisure and production given by a CES production function 
of capital and labour augmented by a spillover.
We now show that the conditions a < l,</> < 0 are in fact necessary for 
stability. First we prove that, no matter what the values of the other parameters 
are, <j> > 0 precludes stability. In fact
(i-x)y l [a L * +  1 — a] +  (1 — 0)(1 — a)
r (2- J -x)






since the suppressed terms are both positive. But the expression on the right- 
hand side of inequality 25 is always positive for tj> > 0, since > l.4 So
we need only to examine the case in which a > 1, < 0. With a CES production
function L is implicitly defined by
(1 -  a )(l -  a)L l~* -  a<7(2~ g ~,^-£ + ^  =  p fa +  (1 -  a)L~*] ~*+1
( i - x )  ( i - x )  L J
(26)
Notice that the derivative with respect to L of the left hand side is always 
negative while the derivative with respect to L of the right hand side is always 
positive for a > l,</> < 0. So the two curves intersect only once— L is unique.




























































































We also have that the higher is p the lower is L. So we consider L when p = 0, 
i.e. the solution to
L =
acri?( i - x )
+ (! -  a)(l -  v)l~*
(27)
The second term in the denominator is increasing in <j) so that as </>goes to 
minus infinity L goes to its upper bound that is again But 'necluality 37
cannot hold if a is more than one. This completes the proof. Notice that since 
as is clear from equation 21 the time derivative of labour supply is a continuous 
function of labour supply, for 0 < L < 1, there cannot be multiple balanced 
growth paths all locally unstable. So given our proof that the restrictions <j> > 0 
and/or a > 1 are sufficient to rule out local indeterminacy we know that these 
restrictions rule out global indeterminacy as well.
In conclusion we have shown that a model with one good produced under 
constant returns to capital and decreasing returns to labour, i.e. featuring a 
downward sloping labour demand can have a stable balanced growth path and 
that for indeterminacy we need a low elasticity of substitution of labour and 
capital and an intertemporal elasticity of consumption less than one i.e. that 
the marginal utility of consumption declines slowly with consumption.
Stability means that if the economy is near balanced growth and labour 
supply drops slightly while consumption increases slightly then labour supply 
returns to its balanced growth level and the consumption capital ratio returns 
to its balanced growth level.
Such stability implies indeterminacy. The transversality condition may 
imply that the economy converges to a balanced growth path, but this does not 
determine either the current consumption level or the current labour supply. In­
stead consumption and labour supply can take a range of values each consistent 
with utility maximization and perfect foresight. As is well known this in turn 
means that economically irrelevant publicly observable variables (sunspots) can 
effect the economy even if all agents are rational utility maximizers with ra­
tional expectations. This is of some interest especially since the effects of a 
sunspot are permanent. The long run expected value of labour supply and of 
the consumption capital ratio are not affected by the sunspot, but the level of 
consumption and the capital stock are affected.
A sunspot can lead rational agents to supply less labour and to consume 
more. This will lower their wealth at every future time and the difference 




























































































such sunspot will never diminish. A low level of labour supply implies a low 
interest rate and high consumption capital ratio. This means that the capital 
stock grows slowly. Eventually the growth rate of capital will converge to the 
higher rates which would have occurred without the sunspot, but the growth 
rates can never cross. This means that differences in the capital stock at each 
time will widen more and more slowly but never contract.
3 G rowth M axim izing Public Policy
The decentralized solution to the model described above is not optimal, since 
firms and investors ignore the positive externality caused by investment. Since 
all citizen-worker-consumers are identical optimal lump sum taxation is feasible. 
A government could tax its citizens a lump sum according to a deterministic 
function of time which would exactly equal the revenues it wished. If tax rev­
enues are not returned to consumers, the reduction in their wealth causes them 
to supply more labour which increases the interest rate and the growth rate. 
This leads to a rather counterintuitive point. Suppose the government is unable 
to observe who works and who owns capital so that it is not capable to subsidize 
investment or work. Instead the tax revenue is used to finance the provision of 
goods that do not affect the marginal utility of private consumption or the pro­
duction possibilities of the private sector. This assumption is useful to isolate 
the effects of taxation from those of government expenditure. It turns out that 
the growth maximizing policy is to fund pure waste via a poll tax.
Consider the model modified to allow government consumption (assumed 
to be pure waste) and with a Cobb-Douglas production function—i.e. with 0 
equal to zero— so the instantaneous budget constraint becomes equation 28
K= Y  -  C - G  = LaK l~a~Ka - C - G  (28)
The government chooses G or, to be more exact, the government taxes 
each citizen in the population (normalized to one) G and throws the proceeds 
away. We consider simple policies of the form
G = t K  = t K  (29)
where r  is a constant and K  is used to remind the reader that the taxes are 




























































































In balanced growth, as above, the growth rate of consumption and of the 
capital stock are the same and so the instantaneous budget constraint implies 
equation 30
(1 — a)La — p
T = La -  c - (30)
.Where c is the balanced growth consumption capital ratio. Equation 30 
has total derivative equation 31
dr = ^-------- f  1 j  aLa ldL — dc (31)
As noted above c is monotonically decreasing in L and so c is monotoni- 
cally decreasing in L according to equation 32
d.L (1 — x) L J (32)
Plugging equation 32 into equation 31 gives the effect of government waste 
on balanced growth path labour supply equation 33 5
dL L'~a()< —  = ------
d r  a
a  — 1 
a + 1 +
a(l — a )
(1 — x)
(! ~ g )
( i - x )
1 - 1
(1 — a)L~l (33)
This means that an increase in government spending increases the bal­
anced path growth rate. Note that the economy is unstable. This means that 
the only way to satisfy the transversality condition is to jump immediately to 
the balanced growth path so the economy is always in balanced growth and the 
policy of tax and waste increases the growth rate as soon as it is introduced. An 
anticipated future increase in tax and waste policies has a similar effect, since 
the effect of the policy is a pure income effect.
Interestingly it is possible to find parameter values for which the welfare 
maximizing policy involves taxing and wasting.
5The sign of ^  is clear if we consider that
+  f1-") f I 
( l - x )  + ( i - x ) u • a)L~
a(i-<r) , (1-a)/, \ .
' + n ^ T 1 _ a>
a  1 ( 1— cr)(<7+x — 1) ^  n 




























































































Define the balanced path growth rate to be g, then the effect of a tax and 
waste policy on the growth rate is given by equation 34
dg (1 — a)aLa 1 dL 1 — a
dr a dr + a ] + q + a -  1
(34)
recall the consumers objective function which for constant L = L and consump­
tion growing at rate g becomes equation 35
V = [°° (1 -  Ly~xdtJo 1 — a (35)
Integrating and considering equations 4 and 7, equation 35 becomes equation 
36
, 1_ctZ/1-<7)(q-1) (1 -  L)2-* -g [a  ( l - a ) 'V = K ln (36)
0 (1 -  <r) ( p - g {  1 -  <r)) V 1 -  X
The derivative of the log of V (assuming a less than one) with respect to r  is:
d logV 
dr
(1 — <r)(a — 1) (1 -
(1 ~ L )
+ §  <">
where e = p — g(l — a) > 0 and we have used the fact that, since g = -  a)y  —p, 
— a(i-a)La 1 rpQ s^ow t )qle expression inside the parenthesis can be 
positive note that the parameters of the model can be chosen to give any desired 
(positive) value of L less than 2\~a_ and any positive value of e, with the two 
linked in the following way:
aLa + e q(1 — cr)(l — L)La 1(i-x) (38)
Equation 38 can be derived by considering the expressions for the balanced rate 
of growth of consumption and capital gc = gk =  g —equations 5 and 10. gk is 
calculated by substituting in equation 10 the expression for C/ K  obtained by 
equations 4 and 7. With a Cobb-Douglas technology we then get:
gc =  H - t f e
but since p =  (1 — a)gc+e we can rewrite the first equation as gc = (1 —a)La — e. 
Equating gc and gk then implies equation 38.
As e goes to zero from above and L goes to 2-J- x ^ le term inside the 




























































































— (2 — x ~ fr)2( 1 — x)-1 while the third goes to plus infinity. This means that 
starting with no tax the introduction of a tax can lead to a gigantic increase 
in welfare. In general it is possible to find parameter values such that a tax 
and waste policy improves welfare compared to market equilibrium without a 
government. For example for a — a — |  = L, the coefficient of ^  in equation 
. 5(2-v/2)
37 18 -T % --
An attempt to provide an intuitive explanation for this result is the fol­
lowing: in this model due to externalities to capital accumulation the rental 
rate of capital is inefficiently low. A lump-sum tax reducing disposable income 
induce people to work more thus increasing the rate of return on capital and in 
a sense internalizing the externalities. This has a positive effect on welfare. For 
the overall effect to be positive this indirect substitution effect must outweigh 
the negative direct effect on welfare caused by the subtraction of resources from 
the private sector.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a model with one good produced from capi­
tal and labour that can have a stable balanced growth path. If the economy 
is in the proximity of the balanced growth path and consumption and leisure 
increase then leisure eventually returns to its balanced growth level and the 
consumption capital ratio returns to its balanced growth. Such stability im­
plies indeterminacy. Consumption and labour supply can take a continuum of 
values each consistent with utility maximization and perfect foresight. As is 
well known this in turn means that economically irrelevant publicly observable 
variables (sunspots) can effect the economy even if all agents are rational utility 
maximizers with rational expectations. This is of some interest especially since 
the effects of a sunspot are permanent. The long run expected value of labour 
supply and of the consumption capital ratio are not affected by the sunspot, 
but the level of consumption and the capital stock are affected.
Coming to tax policy we have shown that when labour supply is elastic a 
lump sum tax will increase growth, by making people work more, even if the 
tax revenue is not used in incomethrown away instead of being used to subsidize 
investment. Moreover we have shown that for some parameter values a lump 
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